New Media Rhetoric and Wikipedia

I thought I would share my conference proposal for International Society for the History of Rhetoric conference. I have a feeling its probably a bit too contemporary (ie, it mentions computers) for this conference, but there’s no harm in trying. The talk would be building off of what I’ll be discussing at RSA later this month: though that talk focuses on the complex ways [non-Platonic/Aristotelian] in which Wikipedia establishes credibility. I’ll post links to that material later. I guess my preoccupation with wikis extends from their complete “newness”- there’s really nothing in history that compares to the magnitude to which they precipitate, harness, and purpose human interaction and thinking. Anywho, here’s the proposal:

In We the Media, journalist turned new media proponent Dan Gillmor argues that digital technologies present us with an entirely new form of communication; in addition to “one-to-one” communication (which we can identify with dialectic) and “one-to-many” (rhetoric), digital technologies offer “many-to-many” communication (26). As Gillmor demonstrates through an examination of contemporary blogs, forums, wikis, and social aggregators, audiences are no longer exterior, static entities to be acted upon. They are now far more active agents in a far more dynamic communicative process.

I argue that this developing communicative medium will further push rhetoric to break away from its Platonic / Aristotelian preoccupation with objective truth and persuasion. As audiences gain more response ability, rhetors will have to work with audiences rather than upon them. The dynamism of digital communicative environments, in addition to their emphasis on collecting intelligence, will call for a rhetoric more concerned with fostering collaboration than producing terminal synthesis.

This does not mean that rhetoric should abandon all discussion of persuasion, only that its focus needs to expand to include non-synthetic negotiation of difference. I will offer as example of this dual need a presentation of Wikipedia. The “article” dimension of a Wikipedia entry reflects a traditional interest in truth and knowledge production. But every Wikipedia entry is more than just its “article”: it is a massive collection of pages, including a lively “discussion” section and a history of all changes made to a page. Every knowledge object becomes embedded in a web of social relations. These other, more social, dimensions to each entry symbolize the ways in which “many-to-many” communication is changing our information landscape and suggest how rhetoric needs to augment persuasion with an interest in cooperation.

I will conclude by arguing this transformation is anticipated in the work of Burkian rhetorical theorist Jim Corder. Throughout the mid-1980’s Corder argued that the work of rhetoric extended beyond persuasion to something more akin to “love.” Designed to deal with the intensified wrangle of the digital barnyard, a rhetoric of cooperation builds off of Corder and Burke by emphasizing that the ends of rhetoric aren’t always concerned with persuasion—sometimes they are concerned with keeping the conversation hospitable, active, and inviting.

Posted in burke, corder, digital-media, diss, presentation, rhetoric, technology, theory, theory-in-practice, wiki, wikipedia | Comments Off on New Media Rhetoric and Wikipedia

New Media Rhetoric

The first paragraph of George Oates’ recent A List Apart article “Community: From Little Things, Big Thigns Grow” reflects something I’ve been trying to articulate for a few years:

People don’t like being told what to do. We like to explore, change things around, and make a place our own. Hefty design challenges await the makers of websites where people feel free to engage; both with the system itself and with each other. Embrace the idea that people will warp and stretch your site in ways you can’t predict—they’ll surprise you with their creativity and make something wonderful with what you provide.

I’ve been writing the theoretical chapter of my dissertation, a chapter that focuses on Levinas’ rejection of Cartesian consciousness, the primacy of ontology, and the fetish for Being. Along the way, I’ve come to recognize why Levinas (and myself) distrust Platonic / Aristotelian rhetoric: it presumes a rhetorician acting upon an audience. Audience members are framed at best as deliberating judges or at worst as passive receptacles.

But, by empowering audiences, equipping them with responsibility, new media technologies oppose this imposed passivity. For better or worse. Perhaps we will lose patience. Perhaps we won’t listen long enough before we begin to speak. Or perhaps we will. I admit I only read the first few paragraphs of the article before I felt compelled to write a post, to respond, to create, to link, to contribute. And what we need is a rhetoric that focuses on these dynamics–group dynamics. A working with rather than a working on. In Oates’ article we hear a call of what such a rhetoric might look like:

Any community—online or off—must start slowly, and be nurtured. You cannot “just add community.” It simply must happen gradually. It must be cared for, and hosted; it takes time and people with great communication skills to set the tone and tend the conversation.

When Flickr was born, Caterina Fake and I spent many hours greeting new members personally. We opened up chat windows with each new visitor to say “Hi! I work here, and I’d love to help you get started, if you have any questions.” We also provided public forums where staff were present and interactive. Those decisions proved crucial, because apart from creating points where we could inject a certain culture, it was all so personal.

If you want to stir your audience on a rapidly growing community site, take advantage of what we learned—hire a community manager. Or two. You’ll need a clever communicator with a lot of experience being online to help welcome people and provide ongoing support as your community grows. Show your personality and be available. Flickr’s tone is not necessarily suitable for every community, but the point is, the tone is evident everywhere you look.

I like that, in describing Flickr’s origins, Oates states that they were looking to construct a culture. Rhetors can still have a purpose, they can still seek to act upon, to persuade (to use a word that I consider quite dirty). They retain a sense of agency. But “action” is framed as dialectical- or, and we don’t have a word for this yet- plural-ectical. Multiple? Complex? Rhetoricians are clever communicators; clever [digital] communicators are those who generate discussion among persons; discussion, interaction, contact: the basis of a functional community.

For a few centuries, or millennia (?), intellectual activity has been primarily identified as an individual activity, even if the end result of this activity contributes to a society of scholars or Great Conversation. It would seem we are approaching a new era in which intellectual activity, while at times still very much a singular experience, is also at other times very much different from this tradition. Here’s the idea I’ve been tripping over: might our new media come to represent a bridge between two long opposed intellectual traditions: rhetoric and dialectic? Is this the explication of Dan Gilmor’s claim that the internet, for the first time, provides us with many to many conversation? Excuse the questions, but this is one of those ideas that I realize I should have put together awhile ago. Its one of those ideas that I’ve been teaching to long before I could articulate.

Tools such as del.icio.us and Google Docs are beginning to reshape our intellectual landscape. I am interested in the development of rhetoric (and composition) pedagogy that addresses these possibilities; and I believe we can turn to other disciplines, conversations, people (such as Oates) to see what kinds of preparation could benefit 21st century citizens.

Posted in digital-media, diss, rhetoric, teaching, technology, theory-in-practice | Comments Off on New Media Rhetoric

Score one for the good guys

For those that don’t read /., this came across today:

“In Atlantic v. Howell, the judge has totally eviscerated the RIAA’s theories of ‘making available’ and ‘offering to distribute.’ In a 17-page opinion (PDF), District Judge Neil V. Wake carefully analyzed the statute and caselaw, and based on a ‘plain reading of the statute’ concluded that ‘Unless a copy of the work changes hands in one of the designated ways, a “distribution” under [sec.] 106(3) has not taken place.’ The judge also questioned the sufficiency of the RIAA’s evidence pointing towards defendant, as opposed to other members of his household. This is the Phoenix, Arizona, case in which the defendant is representing himself, but received some timely help from his friends. And it’s the same case in which the RIAA suggested that Mr. Howell’s MP3s, copied from his CDs, were unlawful. One commentator calls today’s decision ‘Another bad day for the RIAA.'”

Score one for the good guys. Links are available from the original story.

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Violence and Metaphysics, part 2

Some rough draft I was working through today:

The best liberation from violence is a certain putting into question, which makes the search for an archia tremble. Only the thought of Being can do so, and not traditional ‘philosophy’ or ‘metaphysics.’ The latter are therefore ‘politics’ which can escape ethical violence only by economy: by battling violently against the violences of the an-arhy whose possibility, in history, is still the accomplice of archism.” (“V&M” 141)

The violence here comes both from theory and totality (knowledge) and from the search for foundations and hierarchy(ontology). Knowing is always a political act, often a totalitarian one, which subsumes the alterity of others (our act of theorizing them as existents reduces the possibilities of what they may be, and of what Being might be in general). For Levinas, then, there is a great suspicion of knowledge and the desire to know, of traditional philosophy and metaphysics, of any thought principally concerned with discerning archia.

Hence why Levinas insists that our relation to the other is not a knowledge (and Derrida repeatedly points out that Heidegger’s conceptualization of Being is not as a genre or category of knowledge). Our relation to the Other, or our relation to Being, both transcend positive knowledge. They are the something through which “knowledge,” and language as a precondition of knowledge, emerges. The transcendental relationship between Being and Other thus, from first principle, suspend all knowledge. The “thought of Being,” as Derrida puts it above, is the question of Being- a continual (let’s say deconstructive, to use the term in its “proper” sense) questioning of the transcendental property of Being. Such impossibility, emanating from the core of all knowing, opens us to an ethics mindful of the requisite violence of theorization, communication, philosophy, and rhetoric.

For Levinas, a suspension of the primacy of Being opens us to the ethical- rather than considering others as Beings (which requires an act of ontology, categorization, theorization, etc). Levinas places the thought of Being (a questioning of Being’s primacy atypical for traditional philosophy) at the forefront of his thinking. Derrida notes:

Not only is the thought of Being not ethical violence, but it seems that no ethics—in Levinas’s sense—can be opened without it. Thought—or at least the precomprehension of Being—conditions (in its own fashion, which excludes every ontic conditionality: principles, causes, premises, etc.) the recognition of the essence of the existent (for example, existent as other, as other self, etc.). It conditions respect for the other as what it is, other. Without this acknowledgement, which is not a knowledge, or let us say without this “letting-be” of an existent (Other) as something existing outside me in the essence of what it is (first in its alterity), no ethics would be possible” (137-38)

In the first line above, Derrida stresses that Levinas’s questioning of Being, though disrupting the classical foundations for ethics, actually seeks to extend the possibility of ethics by reducing the security with which we think “presence” and “truth.” Let me playfully suggest that the conditions of digitality, both social and material, that I have elucidated in chapters one and two suggest the possibility for “letting-be”: for experiencing and respecting the other as other. At the heart of this suggestion lies the transience, uncertainty, and anxiety attached to the medium. To be clear: such conditioning and respect does not promise to end violence- there is no final idealism here. But I do assert a hope, albeit a tentative one, that exposure to the conditions of conditionality, to the transience, uncertainty, and anxiety of the digital, can temper the violence of politics, ontology, communication, possibility, life. To understand how the digital might promote such “letting-be,” we must familiarize ourselves with another critical and complex Levinasian concept: the face, and its relation to metaphysical ethics.

Posted in derrida, digital-media, diss, ethics, levinas | Comments Off on Violence and Metaphysics, part 2

Another Reason to Love the Interweb

So this obnoxious sports writer, Kevin Hench of Fox Sports, writes a weekly Hit List in which he takes shots at athletes swirling the drain. This past week, he made disparaging comments on Tampa Bay Ray’s outfielder Rocco Baldelli, essentially arguing that Baldelli was faking an injury and was wasting his talent. Except Hench must have missed the press conference in which Baldelli explains that he has a as-of-yet unidentified life threatening illness that might end his career.

Well, a few Baldelli fans told Hench to go fuck himself. Then they sent the story to FireJoeMorgan.com, a site dedicated to exposing terrible sports journalism. Let me rephrase: an extremely popular site dedicated to exposing terrible sports journalism. So then a lot of FJM’s readers went to the Fox Sports site and proceeded to tell Hench what a douche-bag he is. Some of us… er… them, went as far as to create accounts so we could post our complaints (which probably ensures that Fox won’t fire Hench, since he’s driving up the traffic). Still, there’s nothing quite like a bunch of people coming together to tell some loud mouth asshole that he is, undoubtedly, a loud mouth asshole. Here’s my favorite comments:

Hey, everybody needs to step back and appreciate what Hench has done here. It is very rare that every single comment says the same thing…usually there is one comment that says everyone needs to get a sense of humor; but luckily this is such a piece of BLEEP that it is unanimous that Hench is an BLEEP -clown. For that I say, thank you Hench for being so moronic.

And:

Nice article, Hench. I’d love to read your takes on Andres Galarraga’s “cancer” and Mario Lemieux’s “non-Hodgkins lymphoma.” You are either incredibly insensitive or plain uninformed and are therefore either a d-bag or a hack

Posted in sports | Comments Off on Another Reason to Love the Interweb

Future of Sports

For the past few years I’ve been arguing that the steroids controversy in baseball is about much more that the purity of sport- it touches the incredible transformations medical science will bring to biology. It is about our relationship to our bodies. We might go as far as to call it the next great imperialization, as we move “in.”

Sports Illustrated has a story this week on Dr. Se-Jin Lee- a professor of molecular biology and genetics- who has isolated the genes regulating muscle generation. The slant of the story, of course, is how such procedures could further exacerbate problems with performance enhancement in professional sports; but this misses the larger point. From the article:

Lee is pushing the frontier of genetic research into muscle building because the same breakthroughs that could boost performance in sports might also bring about a medical revolution. Advances could not only mitigate the effects of diseases like muscular dystrophy but also give senior citizens back their strength–which, often, would amount to giving them back their lives.

And:

Thanks to the Human Genome Project, someday all of us could carry our entire genetic blueprint on a microchip, which we’d present to doctors during medical treatments.

To be honest, I have mixed feelings about this article and the broader issue. Though I try to take care of my body (working out, Edy’s slow-churned, etc.), I’ve never considered my body sanctimoniously. If it didn’t work, and I could “replace” it, no problem. I’ve also always been sympathetic to Cipher from the Matrix– I’ll take a nice, virtual existence over a shitty “real” world everyday of the week. No hesitation. Hey, its all virtual anyway.

I think what this story touches upon, the reason I felt compelled to post something, is that is signals the approach of the debate that will frame the early 21st century in terms of science, ethics, and humanity. If the atomic bomb was the symbol of the 20th century, then, perhaps, the microscopic gene will be the symbol of the 21st. We will have to articulate, and in that articulation limit, what a human should, and perhaps, will be (or be able to become). I sit somewhere in between the silent poles of the article: between an idealistic appreciation (and, as I approach 32, expectation) for the future and an apocalyptic sense of foreboding – a feeling that we tread in areas we are not ready to go. Throughout history, humans haven’t always been the most responsible explorers.

Posted in posthuman, science, sports, theory-in-practice | Comments Off on Future of Sports

Shouldn’t This Be Bigger News

Came across this story on artificial intelligence this morning. Let’s put it alongside this:

I say your civilization because as soon as we started thinking for you it really became our civilization which is of course what this is all about.

Cause, really, the thing is that four-year olds grow up so quickly.

Posted in productive mess, technology | Comments Off on Shouldn’t This Be Bigger News

Notes on Of Grammatology

It took me a bit to get started, but here we go…

If, as Derrida suggests, writing threatens language, then digital technology extends this threatening, by engaging so many more people in the “play.” As the actors gather, as the stage widens, the stakes increase. In 1968 Derrida suggested:

The advent of writing is the advent of this play; today such a play is coming into its own, effacing the limit starting from which one had thought to regulate the circulation of signs, drawing along with it all the reassuring signifieds, reducing all the strongholds, all the out-of-bound shelters that watched over the field of language. (7)

Forty years later, what better sign of this coming (change for Derrida is always a specter of the future) do we have than wikipedia? Wikipedia realizes much of what Derrida refers to as the death of the book, “the death of the civilization of the book, of which so much is said and which manifests itself particularly through a convulsive proliferation of libraries” (8). Rather than further replicate the logocentrism of language through a further proliferation of libraries, we are witnessing a transformation- a transformation incited by digital writing. Writing not as a noun, not as objects proliferated across places, but writing as an action “collected” in placeless spaces. We have a proliferation of writers, many of whom are alien to the traditional strong-holds of language and Thought. There work appears, but it does not multiply or collect arithmetically. It appears and disappears. It transforms. Dynamically authored and edited, texts transform. It is these new movements- especially the disappearance, that so differs from the culture of print, presence, and permanence. Rhetoric has long been the art of shifty wordsmiths; it is ready for a digital word in which words actually shift in real time. Digital writing, especially wikipedia, is a celebration of “the human and laborious, finite and artificial inscription” (15). Web 2.0’s open opposition to “expertise” is a rejection of a logocentric divinity that positions truth as external to humanity, especially to the masses. Rather than libraries, we have librarying (and, of course, LibraryThing).

A task that I will face: is librarying logocentric? This is not a question I as of yet feel qualified to answer. But my initial suspicions are yes… and no. Digital technologies are not an absolute break from print/literate culture. They are a transformation. Just as with the transitions from orality to literacy and then from literacy to print, the transition from print to digitality will retain much of what has come before: especially the desire to know, to learn, and to exchange. What will be different, I suggest, is that our knowing, learning, and exchanging will transpire with a stronger exposure to the Face of others. Our contact will knowledge (and others) will be tempered by the ethical encounter with the Face of the Other. Words will not be dead, but uncomfortably living.

Posted in derrida, diss, theory, wiki, writing-tech | Comments Off on Notes on Of Grammatology

Sometimes the “Rhetoric of Change” Really Means Change

I wanted to share Norm Scheiber’s article “The Audacity of Data” on Obama’s economic theory. It seems that Obama strays from traditional political philosophy in favor of something which Scheiber labels as “non-ideological” but which I might refer to as more complex (in a Mark C. Taylor sense), dare I say more rhetorical. Let me explain.

First, Scheiber explains that contemporary economic theory is going through a kind of sea change- the old (read:modern) methods, which relied on a mythical “perfectly rational” human actor as a foundation for its theory, are being challenged. If you’ve read anything on the history of complexity theory, then you know that this actor has never existed. Economic theorists were among the first to see the social significance of complexity. The radicals began abandoning top-down, hierarchical models for explaining ALL human behavior in favor of messy, but more valid, insights into particular… well let’s call them economic ecologies (see Waldrip for a very readable if annoyingly hero-izing account of complexity’s rise). All the development of modern economic theory is a prime example of what goes wrong when you become a slave to your deductive theory: you create a wonderful, “perfect” model that doesn’t in anyway relate to how people actually live their life. D’oh. Perhaps it explains how people should live their life- but that’s a very, very different thing. I’m thinking here of a favorite saying of my friend Nathaniel Rivers from Kenneth Burke: beware of confusing “is” with “ought.” Hey, Nathaniel, can you give me a source on this?

On to Obama. First, let’s not make the mistake of labeling Obama as non-ideological. Everyone lives according to an ideology, if we understand ideology to mean the systems of representations that underlie and inform our daily lived experience. And I’m recalling that definition from Althusser, thanks to Google I can add: “the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of life” (qtd. in Michael G. Cooke). Scheiber, of course, belongs to a different discourse community- I just don’t want any Marxists breathing down our neck for the next few paragraphs.

What we might say, however, and what Scheiber details quite clearly, is that Obama’s theoretical approach to economics (and politics) is anti-idealist and anti-deductive, eschewing overarching theories in favor of localized action. And Scheiber works hard to detail that this doesn’t equate to being non-academic; if anything, Obama is working to put himself in contact with cutting-edge academics whose non-traditional approaches run against normal political wisdom. Quote: “the Obama wonks [and this is a loving term] tend to be inductive— working piecemeal from a series of real-world observations.” He compares the Obamanauts to the Clintonites, noting that while the latter wanted to institute massive top-down changes, the former works within existing paradigms, tweaking what works and exorcising what doesn’t. Here’s a kick-ass metaphor:

Think of the contrast here as the difference between science-fiction writers and engineers. Reich and Galston are the kinds of people who’d sketch out the idea for time travel in a moment of inspiration. Goolsbee et al. could rig up the DeLorean that would actually get you back to 1955.

O.k., maybe a bit over the top. But it makes my brain tingle. Lest we think this approach isn’t rigorous, Scheiber follows up:

And yet, just because the Obamanauts are intellectually modest and relatively free of ideology, that doesn’t mean their policy goals lack ambition. In many cases, the opposite is true. Obama’s plan to reduce global warming involves an ambitious cap-and-trade arrangement that would lower carbon emissions 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050. But cap-and-trade–in which the government limits the overall level of emissions and allows companies to buy and sell pollution permits–is itself a market-oriented approach. The companies most efficient at cutting emissions will sell permits to less efficient companies, achieving the desired reductions with minimal drag on the economy.

The biggest change Obama might bring to politics is a grass-roots, complex, contextualized approach to politics forgoes the rhetoric of “big changes” in favor of something different- something non-utopian but a pragmatic sensibility that works from within. While this approach might not be quite as aptly rhetorical for the current political field, it just might change the way the game is played.

Let’s try that.

Posted in bordieu, complexity, obama, politics, rhetoric, theory, theory-in-practice | Comments Off on Sometimes the “Rhetoric of Change” Really Means Change

del.icio.us (victory-is-mine)

Meg and I are preparing for our first real date since Rowan was born (6 months)- tonight’s Ben Folds concert. I wish I saw him with the Five, but I’m still excited for the show.

I just sent of a webtext on the pedagogical dimensions of del.icio.us, the social bookmarking technology of social bookmarking technologies. Seriously, del.icio.us changed my life. I submit to any non-believer (i.e., non-user) the Firefox test- just try surfing the web wish del.icio.us for a week. You’ll wonder how you ever lived without it.

As a bit of a sneak-peak, to celebrate the victory-is-mine moment of getting this off to the C&C special edition editor, I thought I would share a portion of the introduction that covers the theoretical implications of tagging. This works has a direct link to my dissertation in its focus on how digital technology contributes to the widespread, ongoing paradigm shift from Being to becoming, from product to process, from The Self to the group, from Truth to contingency. Here it is:

Beyond these benefits, the most significant advantage of del.icio.us
concerns its method of cataloging
entries: tagging. del.icio.us
defines tags
as:

…one-word descriptors that you can assign to your
bookmarks on
del.icio.us. They’re a little bit like keywords but non-hierarchical.
You can assign as many tags to a bookmark as you like and easily rename
or delete them later. Tagging can be a lot easier and more flexible
than fitting your information into preconceived categories or folders.

Tagging does not seek to replicate a physical organization system for
information; there’s no “files” being placed in “folders.” In The Long
Tail
, Chris Anderson
points out the ontological/categorical/strict-taxonomic organization of
systems such
as the Dewey decimal system, though effective organizational
strategies for physical objects, fail to capitalize on the
unique, non-physical properties of digital information (156-159). Such
top-down,
hierarchical systems are designed to properly “place” physical objects.
Tagging represents a mode of organization that can only be realized
once information becomes digital and is thus no longer tied to the
limitations of physical place. Tagged data has no singular proper
place- users in folksonomies such as del.icio.us can simultaneously tag
data in multiple ways, allowing it to simultaneously exist across any
number of spaces. Rather than attempting to organize information
according to
pre-existing, structured categories, Anderson imagines

a world of ad-hoc organization, determined by whatever makes
sense at
the time. That’s more like a big pile of stuff on a desk instead of
rows of items stringently arranged on shelves. Sure it may seem messy,
but that’s just because it’s a different kind of organization:
spontaneous, contextual order, easily reordered into a different
context as need be. (159)

Thinking of del.icio.us, we can add “idiosyncracy” to Anderson’s
description of tagging as a mode of organization. Each del.icio.us user
is likely to tag pages differently. Such a random system might not be
as “neat” as the Dewey decimal system, but its flexibility and fluidity
allow it to effectively capture
what Suriowecki and others refer to as “the wisdom
of crowds.” To overstate the theoretical implications: del.icio.us can
be seen
as a collective attempt to explore, organize, and share the web
underwritten by a spirit of enthusiasm and generosity (“Look what I
found!”) rather than one of mastery or colonization (“We must order
this”). While an extended discussion of the impact of tagging and
digitality is beyond my scope here, those interested should see Dave
Weinberger’s
insightful Everything is
Miscellaneous
which ambitiously
approaches a new metaphysics for digital information (see especially
pages 92-95 for how del.icio.us and tagging contribute to this effort;
see also his webtext “The
Hyperlinked Metaphysics of the Web”
). Interested parties
should also give Clay Shirky’s seminal “Ontology
is Overrated: Categories, Links, and Tags”
some attention.

Posted in computers-and-writing, del.icio.us, diss, theory-in-practice, victory-is-mine, writing-tech | Comments Off on del.icio.us (victory-is-mine)